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Article 9

NOTES
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of The Sisters of Saint Joseph, of the diocese of Lansing, Michigan.
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Michigan. Degree A.B., Western State Teachers College, 1913; A.M.,
and Ph.D., The Catholic University of America. Special Lecturer before
allied college groups, 1934, at Nazareth College: Theme, The Social
Philosophy of Pope Leo XIII. Special lecturer before religious teachers,
1937, in Detroit: on EcclesiasticalHistory. Author: THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: AN HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL COMMENTARY. Held a fellowship, summers 1934-1936, in an International Law Conference, University of Michigan. Listed, 1938, among "Leading American Women".
Elected member, 1938, of The University of Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters. The article appearing in this issue of THE NOTRE
DAE LAWYER was read before historical and legal groups meeting in
Philadelphia, December, 1937, in commemoration of the sesquicentennial of the signing of the Constitution of The United States, September, 17, 1787.

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE-SCHOOL REGULATIONS.-No

doctrine of American Constitu-

tional law is guarded more jealously than that of freedom of religion
and liberty of conscience. Ever since the birth of our nation various
sects have scrutinized legislative acts for possible infringements upon
religious liberty. Time after time courts have been called upon to determine whether this or that particular legislation encroaches upon the
rights of some one of our citizens. Quite frequently, the doctrine of
religious liberty is invoked to review school board regulations. Oft-times
well meaning regulations have been thrust into courts as a violation of
some person's constitutional rights. Of recent note is the salutation of
the American flag by school children. The widespread fear of Communism, Facism and Socialism caused many school boards to pass regulations requiring students to salute the flag and recite the pledge. One particular religious sect, called Jehovah's Witnesses, conscientiously object
to this practice as being contrary to their religion. Under their instigation the question has been brought up during the last few years in numerous courts. The facts in all these cases are substantially alike. The
school board passes a rule requiring all school teachers to have the children salute the flag and recite the pledge in unison. The petitioners refuse to do so because their parents warn them that it is wrong and forbidden by God's commandments. To sustain their position they quote
from the Bible, Exodus, chapter 20, verses 4 and 5:
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Exodus, chapter 20:
4. "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath,
or that is in the water under the earth.
5. "Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them, for I
the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers
upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that
hate me."
Despite the fact that state laws require them to attend a public
school or some other approved school, petitioners, upon their refusal to
salute, are expelled. Although the aid of the court was besought the
supreme courts of Massachusetts,' New Jersey,2 Georgia,3 and California 4 and the Suffolk County court of New York 5 denied them relief.
These courts maintained that the exercise was purely patriotic and could
in no way be construed as a religious practice. The expulsion of the children was likewise ratified, reasoning that since the school was free and
maintained by the state, the children could enjoy the privilege of attending only by conforming to the regulations and customs of that school,
and if they disapproved of the custom they should withdraw and enter
some other school. These various state courts based their decisions upon
Hamilton v. University of California6 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1934. Here plaintiffs were students at the University
of California. They objected to the two year military training course
saying that war and military training were repugnant to the tenets and
discipline of their church. The Supreme Court, however, upholding the
right of the school to expel them, said that the state did not force them
to go to the University of California, even though they were unable to
afford a different college; hence the boys' right to stay at the University
depended upon compliance with its requirements. This decision led the
state courts to uphold the regulation requiring salutation of the flag as
reasonable and proper. More recently, however, the question has arisen
in Pennsylvania. 7 This time the case is in the District Federal court.
The United States District court refused to follow the state decisions
and propounded a distinction between the flag case and the military
training case. The honorable judge points out that there is no law compelling students to go to the University whereas state law does require
these children to attend school. He concluded therefore that the decision
1 Nicholls v. Mayor and School Committee of Lynn, 7 N.E. (2d) 577 (Mass.

1937).
2
3
4

Hering v. State Board of Education, 189 Atl. 629 (N. J. 1937).
Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 218 (Ga. 1937).

5

People v. Sandstrom, 3 N. Y. S.1006 (1938).

6

293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. Ed. 343 (1934).

7

Gobitis v. Minersville School District, 21 F. Supp. 581 (District Court, E. D.

Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 Pac. (2d) 391 (Cal. 1938).

Pa. 1937) (Motion to dismiss denied); ibid, 24 F. Supp. 271 (1938)

granted).

(Injunction

NOTES
does not control the case, and that it was a violation of petitioners' constitutional rights to prohibit them from attending public schools-particularly so since they cannot afford to attend any other. The Court
said: "We are aware that a number of courts have reached a contrary
conclusion. (Names cases cited in footnotes 1-4). In each of these cases
it was held that the salute to the flag could have no religious significance. In so holding, however, it appears to us that the courts which
decided these cases overlooked the fundamental principle of religious
liberty to which we have referred; namely, that no man, even though he
be a school director or a judge, is empowered to censor another's religious convictions or set bounds to the areas of human conduct in which
those convictions should be permitted to control his actions, unless compelled to do so by an overriding public necessity which properly requires
the exercise of the police power. Furthermore it appears that the courts
in these cases largely relied on Hamilton v. Regents of University of
California, 293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. Ed. 343, in which the
Supreme Court held that a regulation of the University of California
making military training compulsory for all students did not unduly
infringe the liberty of students who were opposed to war and military
training on religious grounds. That decision, however, was placed upon
the ground that, although the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to
the principles, and to teach the doctrines on which these students based
their objections to military training, is included in the religious liberty
of the individual, that liberty had not been infringed by the regulation
in question, since the objecting students were not required by law to
attend the university, and interest of public safety to require its citizens
to prepare for its defense by force of arms was paramount to their right
to religious liberty."
Continuing further in his opinion the judge said: "In the case before
us the attendance of the minor plaintiffs at defendants' school is, as we
have seen, required by law. Furthermore their refusal to salute the flag
does not prejudice the public safety. Consequently Hamilton v. Regents
of University of California, supra, does not support the validity of the
regulation here involved. On the contrary that regulation, although undoubtedly adopted from patriotic motives, appears to have become in
this case a means for the persecution of children for conscience sake.
Our beloved flag, the emblem of religious liberty, apparently has been
used as an instrument to impose a religious test as a condition of receiving the benefits of public education. And this has been done without any
compelling necessity of public safety or welfare."
However, despite the stand taken by the District judge, the Supreme
Court of the United States has denied, appeals in Leoles v. Landers8
and Hering v. State Board of Education.9 The hearing was denied for
8 302 U.S.656, 58 S. Ct. 364 (1937).
9 303 U.S.624, 58 S. Ct. 752 (1937).
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lack of a substantive federal question. This would seem to indicate that
the Supreme Court does not believe any constitutional right has been
violated.
The flood of litigation is similar to that which arose out of the reading of the Bible in public schools a few years ago. Court after court was
called upon to enjoin school boards from requiring teachers to read King
James' version of the Bible in classrooms. Courts have split upon its
constitutionality. The majority, however, have upheld the school boards
saying that the mere reading of the Bible without note or comment is
not teaching religion nor is it giving preference to any particular religious sect. 10 They based their decisions upon the ground that a teacher
has the duty to teach children the principles of morality and that no
better book could be used than the Bible filled with moral lessons. The
minority objects that reading a Bible is discriminatory in that it gives
preference to one sect and creates an impression that the chosen version
is correct and the others are false." Even though a child may leave the
room the practice is objectionable since it makes a person feel his religion is merely tolerated and brands him with a religious stigma. In
2
Herold v. ParishBoard of School Directors1 the court remarked: "And
excusing such children on religious grounds, although the number excused might be very small, would be a distinct preference in favor of the
religious beliefs of the majority and would work a discrimination against
those who were excused. The exclusion of a pupil under such circumstances puts him in a class by himself; it subjects him to a religious
stigma; and all because of his religious belief. Equality in public education would be destroyed by such act, under a Constitution which seeks
to establish equality and freedom in religious matters. The Constitution
forbids that this shall be done."
Although these two regulations have caused much excitement their
problem is not unique. School boards' regulations and actions have been
quite frequently contested. In McDowell v. Board of Education of City
of New York 13 the plaintiff, a Quakeress, was teaching school in New
York. Called before the school board she exclaimed that she was opposed to the war with Germany, hated all wars, would not urge her pupils to support war or to perform Red Cross services and did not believe
that a teacher had a duty to train children in war measures. As a result
she was dismissed as being incompetent and inefficient. Bringing this
action she maintains that she was dismissed because of her religion
which is a violation of her constitutional right. The Supreme Court of
10 -People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927) ; Kaplan v. Independent School District of Virginia, 171 Minn. 142, 214 N. W. 18 (1927); Lewis v.
Board of Education, 285 N. Y. S. 164 (affirmed 286 N. Y. S. 175) (1936); Church
v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 100 S. W. 1025 (1907).
11 People v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 343, 92 N. E. 251 (1910).
12 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915).
13 172 N. Y. S. 590 (1918).
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New York held that a teacher had a duty to inculcate in her pupils principles of justice and patriotism and a respect for our laws, that the refusal of this teacher to do so was a violation of that duty, that because of
her religious beliefs she was not capable of performing her duty and concluded that the board was justified in dismissing her as incompetent and
inefficient. The court apparently got around a very delicate situation by
some close reasoning. Being dismissed because her religious beliefs made
her incompetent and inefficient and not because of her religious beliefs
in themselves appears to be a very fine distinction. In view of the crisis,
however, the decision was desirable from the standpoint of public policy.
No less interesting and unusual is Commonwealth v. Herr.14 An act
prohibiting teachers from wearing any dress, insignia, emblem, or mark
which would indicate that the teacher is a member of a particular religious sect was passed. The court held that such an act was a reasonable
regulation by the legislature and was not violative of the Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court had already determined in Reynolds
v. United States 15 that the government cannot interfere with opinions
and beliefs but may govern the practices and actions. Legislatures, furthermore, can prescribe the manner of dress teachers in public schools
should wear and bar all things which may destroy the non-sectarian
character of the school.
On the other hand, where graduation exercises were held in various
churches and ministers and priests were asked to say non-sectarian
prayers the court refused to grant a mandamus compelling the school
board to discontinue the practice. 16 Mere attendance of graduation exercises once a year, the court reasoned, could not be said to be compelling persons to attend a place of worship. Invoking non-sectarian prayers, moreover, is not a violation of constitutional rights since such prayers are invoked in numerous governmental functions as for instance the
opening of Congress. The court did, however, state that although no legal
rights were affected nevertheless because of the ill will and sensitiveness
among the people the board would be wise in discontinuing the procedure.
Compelling a student to attend a place of worship, however, has been
held to be repugnant to his constitutional rights in Miami Military Institute v. Leff. 17 The Miami school had sent out a catalogue to the defendant, a Hebrew, who later sent his son there. Although about $375
had been paid by the father, the school sued for the balance $325-the
tuition for the entire year. The boy about ten days after school opened
was expelled. Plaintiff school bases its right of recovery upon the contract. The son was expelled because he refused to attend Christian
14

229 Pa. 132, 78 At. 68 (1910).

15
16

98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878).
State v. District Board of Joint School District No. 6, 162 Wis. 482, 156

N. W. 477 (1916).
17

220 N. Y. S. 799 (1926).
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churches in the village. The catalogue stated that students were required
to attend in full military dress. Although the defendant's son did not
object to attending the daily religious exercises on campus he refused to
attend church in the village. The school told him that if he did not
attend either a Jewish Synagogue which was fourteen miles away, or go
to the Presbyterian Church he would be expelled. The boy stood his
ground and was dismissed. After disallowing the plaintiff's claim the
court awarded damages to defendant for wrongful dismissal of the
youngster. The court held that compelling the boy to go to a Christian
church was discriminatory and contrary to his constitutional right.
A question which may become increasingly alive in view of large governmental spendings in the field of education is whether school books
and supplies paid by public funds may be furnished to pupils of sectarian schools. Two cases dealing with the question have reached opposite
conclusions. Smith v. Donahue' 8 evolved an act giving the school board
the right to use public funds to furnish school supplies to pupils attending schools of the city of Ogdensburg. The board in pursuance to this
power provided text books and supplies to pupils in parochial schools as
well as public schools. Taxpayers bring suit upon the theory that the
act is unconstitutional since the state Constitution forbids public funds
to be used to aid, directly or indirectly, sectarian and private schools.
The defendants contend that they were supplying the children and not
the schools. Holding that furnishing supplies to pupils attending parochial schools was indirectly aiding the school and therefore repugnant to
the constitution, the court decided against them. A similar act and a
similar constitutional provision gave rise to the controversy in Borden
v. Louisiana State Board of Education.19 Here the court upheld the
board. An opposite conclusion from the New York court, namely, that
these books were supplied to the children regardless of which school they
attended, was reached. The furnishing of books tended to reduce illiteracy thus accomplishing the purpose of the act and such provision
could not be said to be aiding sectarian schools contrary to the constitution. In arriving at this conclusion the court stated: "In our opinion,
which is the view of the majority of the court, these acts violate none of
the foregoing constitutional provisions. One may scan the acts in vain
to ascertain where any money is appropriated for the purchase of school
books for the use of any church, private, sectarian, or even public
school. The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of purchasing school books for the use of the school children of the state, free
of cost to them. It was for their benefit and the resulting benefit to the
state that the appropriations were made. True, these children attend
some school, public or private, the latter, sectarian or non-sectarian, and
that the books are to be furnished them for their use, free of cost, which's 195 N. Y. S. 715 (1922).
19

168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
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ever they attend. The schools, however, are not the beneficiaries -of these
appropriations. They obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved
of a single obligation, because of them. The school children and the
state alone are the beneficiaries."
In passing it would be interesting to note that if the former case is
correct what would be the status of the F. E. R. A. and the N. Y. A.?
Here colleges and schools provide jobs for needy students who are paid
by the Federal government. Since the jobs often consist of work beneficial to the school, could objection be made upon constitutional
grounds? Certainly it has proved to be an aid to many schools.
Objection to regulations however which safeguard the health and
well being of citizens upon religious grounds have been overruled. Although petitioners could not show specifically how they were affected
some have tried to defeat vaccination laws as being unconstitutional
and void because of interference with religious liberty. The courts which
dealt with that particular problem unhesitatingly denied that any religious liberty was attacked and said that mere opinions-if any did exist
-would have to give way to the paramount right to safeguard and pro20
tect the health and well being of school children.
Reviewing the cases discussed it can be said that courts have been
careful to examine any regulation which might be open to objection
upon religious grounds, but before the court will overthrow a regulation
of the board evidence must clearly show that it is a violation of one's
liberty of conscience. Where a violation has been detected they will
never hesitate to safeguard this greatest doctrine of them all-the one
our forefathers risked their lives and fled from Europe to establish.
Carl Doozan.

CORPORATIONS -HYBRID
SECURITIES -INTENT
OF CONTROLLING
STOCKHOLDER AS CRITERION WHETHER ISSUE BORE CUMULATIVE DIViDENDS.-In the recent case of Warburton v. John Wanamaker Philadelphia,1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania based its decision upon the
unique proposition that the state of mind of the controlling stockholder
of a corporation can be the determining criterion as to whether an issue
of securities bears cumulative or non-cumulative dividends. The settlor,
John Wanamaker, owning virtually all the stock of the defendant cor20 Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172, 188 N. E. 677 (1934); State v. Drew, 192
AUt. 629 (N. H. 1937); Streich v. Board of Education, 34 S. D. 169, 147 N. W.
779 (1914); City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S. W.
303 (1918).
1 329 Pa. 5, 196 Ati. 506 (1938).
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poration, had cancelled a $1,000,000 claim against the corporation in
exchange for 10,000 shares of "preferred stock" which he placed in trust
for his daughters. The "preferred stock" was to "receive annual dividends of Six (6) per cent, and not more to be declared by the Board of
Directors." The "recipient of the interest to be derived" from the stock
was expressly denied the rights to vote, inspect corporate books, demand
an accounting, participate in excess profits, exercise control in the management, or to have "any interest direct, or indirect," in the corporation. On liquidation, the "preferred stock" was subsequent to common,
and had no right of participation in any excess. The certificate further
provided that "after six months from demise of John Wanamaker the
within stock shall begin to bear interest." On one year's notice by the
trustee, the corporation was required to purchase at least $50,000 worth
of the stock annually until the entire issue had been redeemed. In some
of the preliminaries 2 to the issue of the "preferred stock" the term "6%
non-cumulative preferred capital stock" had been used. But in the final
documents 3 the issue was referred to solely as "preferred capital stock."
The letter written by Wanamaker creating the trust 4 provided that "as
the interest is declared . . . by action of the Board of Directors . . .

it is to be divided equally, between my daughters, during their life time,
annually, in semi-annual payments." If the corporation purchased the
stock, the proceeds were to be invested in legal securities in trust to pay
the income to the daughters. After their death, the principal "with any
accrued interest thereon, not distributed" was to be paid to specified
remaindermen. The corporation being about to declare dividends on the
common stock after having declared none on the "preferred stock" for
four years, the surviving daughter instituted suit to secure payment of
the passed "dividends." A dividend on common stock was declared during the course of the suit. Upon this agreed statement of facts, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the issue was not non-cumulative, and that the corporation must pay the amount in arrears and six
per cent dividends on the shares outstanding irrespective of whether the
directors declared dividends or not.
Primarily to effectuate the individual purposes of the majority stockholder, the Court thus pierced the veil of John Wanamaker's "incorpo2 The request to the directors to call a stockholders' meeting, the waiver of
notice, the oath of the judges, the return of the judges, and the ballots cast by the
stockholders. The latter three documents recited the terms of the certificate and
every one was signed by all three stockholders, including Wanamaker, the settlor.
3 The resolution adopted by the board of directors, the minutes of the stockholders' meeting, the return to the secretary of state, and the certificate of stock
itself.
4 The certificate had been issued with regard to this letter, the minutes of the
stockholders' meeting stating that the shares were to be issued to the trustee "as
directed by John Wanamaker and . . . in accordance with the terms and conditions of a letter of instructions from John Wanamaker."

NOTES
0
rated business self" 5 in an unusual style of corporate disregard. For
the technique utilized in rendering the decision was similar to that used
in construing a will. Undoubtedly, the settlor's control of the corporation, the issuance of the certificate to discharge a debt bearing regularly
accruing interest, and his clear desire to provide a life income for his
daughters were the factors leading the court to stress the settlor's intent
rather than the preliminary documents. Although courts have hitherto
resorted only to the resolutions and plans preceding and authorizing the
issue in order to determine whether the certificate contained the whole
agreement, 7 the instant decision is sound. In the absence of an express
limitation in the certificate itself,8 it has uniformly been held that preferred stock dividends which are fixed in amount and not dependent
upon net earnings 9 are cumulative. The poor position of the holder of
non-cumulative stock 1 0 justifies this presumption. Under the increasingly accepted view, the holder of non-cumulative stock loses all rights
to dividends not declared during that year even though there were net
earnings for that year. 1 And it is almost impossible to force the directors of the corporation to declare dividends on non-cumulative stock in
absence of an abuse of discretion.' 2 A contrary decision, therefore,
would have enabled the directors, by refusing to declare dividends, to
prevent the beneficiary from receiving the contemplated benefits under

5 Warburton v. John Wanamaker Philadelphia, 329 Pa. 5, 196 Atl. 506, 507
(1938).
6 STEvENs, CORPORATIONS § 19 (1936); WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CoRPoRATE FIcTIoN AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1929) chaps. I, II; 17 ORE. L.
REV. 6 (f937); Radio-Craft Co. v. Westinghouse E. & M. Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 432
(C. C. A. 3d 1925) (principal stockholder held liable for procuring breach of contract through exercise of voting control).
7 Bailey v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry. Co., 17 Wall. (U. S.) 96 (1872); Continental
Insurance Co. v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry., 290 Fed. 87 (C. C. A. 8th 1923); Boardman v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry., 84 N. Y. 157 (1881); Rogers v. New York & Texas
Land Co., 134 N. Y. 197, 32 N. E. 28 (1892); see Annotation 31 A. L. R. 1326.
8

2 CLARK & MARSHALL, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 529a (4)

(1901); 1

Coox,

CORPORATION § 273 (8th ed. 1923); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co.,

215 Pa. 610, 64 AUt. 829 (1906); Henry v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 1 DeG. & 3.
606, 44 Eng. Rep. 858 (1857).
9 2 CLARK & MARSnALL, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 529d (1901); Fidelity Trust

Co. v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., oP. cit. supra, note 8; 12 FLETmER, Cyc. CORP.
(Rev. & Perm. ed. 1932) § 5447; Corry v. Londonderry & Enniskillen Ry. Co., 29
Beav. 263, 54 Eng. Rep. 628 (1860); Elkins v. Camden & AtI. Ry. Co., 36 N. J.
Eq. 233 (1882).
10 See Lattin, Is Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock in Fact Preferred? 25 ILL.
L. REV. 148 (1930).

11 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U. S. 197 (1930); New York, etc., Ry. v.
Nickals, 119 U. S. 296 (1886); Norwich Water Co. v. Southern Ry., 11 Va. L. Reg.
(N. S.) 203 (1925); but see Lattin, op. cit. supra, note 10.
12 Hamblock v. Clipper Lawn Mower Co., 148 Il. App. 618 (1909); 11
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Rev. & Perm. ed. 1932) § 5325; Gehrt v. Collins Plow Co.,
156 I1. App. 98 (1910); also see Channon v. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397
(1920) ; Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919).
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the trust. Nor would the re-investment of any earnings of the corporation accrue to the benefit of the daugthers since the beneficiary was expressly excluded from participating in any excess profits and was subsequent to common stock on liquidation.' 3 And should the trustee, in
order to secure an annual income by investment in legal securities, require the corporation to repurchase the shares, the corporation could
devote the income thus retained from the beneficiary for the purpose of
retiring the principal without paying either "interest" or "dividends."
Clearly, the so-called preference of the certificate is virtually non-existent if held not to carry a guaranteed six per cent annual dividend. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the imposition of the word "non-cumulative" upon the terms of the certificate would have eliminated ambiguity. For the question would then arise whether the right to dividends
is lost forever upon failure of the directors to declare dividends for that
year or whether there is a charge upon the earned surplus of the cor14
poration contingent upon there having been net earnings for that year.
Although the Pennsylvania court proceeded upon the tacit assumption
that holders of non-cumulative stock lost all rights to dividends not
declared during that particular year, it is uncertain, in view of the widespread criticism of this theory, 15 whether such a decision would have
been rendered if the stock in fact had been non-cumulative.
Despite judicial reluctance to force a corporation to declare dividends,' " the decree in the instant case that the corporation "pay to the
plaintiff" is in accord with prior decisions in Pennsylvania requiring the
corporation to pay accumulated dividends where the corporation has
already declared a dividend on common stock without paying off the
arrearages on the preferred. 17 The court thus treated the accumulated
"dividends" as a debt in the nature of interest on a debenture bond.
Although most courts agree that accumulated dividends do not constitute debts of the corporation, 18 the attitude of the court in this particular case, nevertheless, is justified. The combination of the recurrent
use of the term "annual . . . interest," the fixity in amount of "inter-

est," the denial of the right to vote or to participate in excess profits,
13 Compare the anomalous capital structure of the Green Bay and Western
Railroad having common stock containing priorities over one issue of debenture

bonds. DEWING, FINANCIAL PoLcY oF CORPORATIONS 9, n. b. (1926).
14 Lattin, op. cit supra, note 10; Hicks, Rights of Non-cumulative Preferred

Stock, 5 TEmPLE L. Q. 538 (1931); cf. Barclay v. Wabash Ry. Co., 30 Fed. (2d)
260 (C. C. A. 2d 1929) rev'd, Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, supra, n. 11.
15 See Lattin, op. cit. supra, note 10, and articles and comments cited therein;
Hicks, op. cit. supra, note 14.
16 See note 12, supra.
17 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., supra, note 8; Westchester &
Philadelphia Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 77 Pa. St. 321 (1875).

18 Hamblock v. Clipper Lawn Mower Co., note 12, supra; Ellsworth v.

Lyons, 181 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 6th 1910); but see Roberts v. Roberts-Wick Co.,

184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906).

NOTES
and the option in the holder to impose a due date upon the shares and
so obtain ultimate payment of a definite amount, seems to give the certificates the characteristics of a bond. 19 And -to contend that a person
having no "interest direct, or indirect" in the corporation is a stockholder therein would be contrary to usual notions of what constitutes a
stockholder. Nor does regard for the financial structure of the corporation require that contrary treatment be accorded to the particular certificate. Should the accumulations become too heavy for the corporation, scaling down of arrearages could be effectuated through reorganization.2 0 And even if the case had involved the rights of competing
creditors, the terms of the certificate would seem to demand identical
21
treatment.
Phineas Indritz.
Chicago, Illinois.
10 As to when a hybrid security may be classified as a bond, see note 5 U. OF
Cm. L. REV. 308 (1938).

20 As to the degree which cumulative stockholders are protected against scaling down of arrearages on their stock in reorganization, see note 4 U. or CH. L.

REv. 645 (1937).

21 Cook v. Equitable Building & Loan Ass'n, 104 Ga. 814, 30 S. E. 911 (1898)
("stock" bearing 6% interest payable semi-annually with option in purchaser, on
90 day notice, to request repurchase, held to create debtor-creditor relation) ; Burt
v. Rattle, 31 Ohio St. 116 (1876) (non-participating, non-voting preferred stock
guaranteeing semi-annual dividends, with redemption at specified date and secured
by mortgage, held, holders were creditors, not stockholders); Best v. Okla. Mills
Co., 124 Okla. 135, 253 Pac. 1005 (1927) ("preferred stock" payable on due date
with accumulated dividends, having proviso that corporation shall not create any
mortgage or other lien on assets of company without permission of preferred stockholders, non-participating, and having vote only on default, held, a bond) ; Savannah Real Estate, Loan & Building Co. v. Silverberg, 108 Ga. 281, 33 S. E. 908
(1899) (cumulative non-participating, non-voting preferred stock, dividends payable semi-annually and having due date, held, creates a debtor-creditor relation);
see also Wright v. Johnson, 183 Ia. 807, 167 N. W. 680 (1918) (non-participating
cumulative non-voting "preferred stock" redeemable at option of holder, held, a
certificaate of indebtedness). But cf.: Hazel Atlas Glass Co. v. Van Dyk & Reeves,
Inc., 8 Fed. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied, sub nom., Van Dyk v.
Young, 269 U. S. 570 (1925) ("preferred stock" redeemable at due date, cumulative dividends payable annually, no voting rights unless three dividends passed,
held, holders were not creditors) ; Ellsworth v. Lyons, note 18, supra (holders of
"preferred stock" drawing six per cent "interest" or "dividends," payable semiannually and redeemable at due date, held, not creditors since they could exercise
management control at all times and were to be paid only "after payment of all

debts and liabilities"); Spencer v. Smith, 201 Fed. 647 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) (nonparticipating and non-voting "preferred stock" redeemable at due date, having
cumulative dividends payable quarterly, and secured by mortgage on the corporate
property, held, not to create debtor-creditor relationship); Elko Lamoille Power
Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 50 Fed. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931)
(seven per cent cumulative dividends payable semi-annually on non-voting preferred stock redeemable on demand held, not deductible as interest for purposes of
taxation).
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-LABILiTY OF DRAWER ON INSTRUMENT
FORGED BY AGENT UNDER STATUTE INCREASING SCOPE OF BEARER INSTRUMENTS-N. I. L. 9 (3) .- Interesting problems emanate from
amendments made by the different states to uniform laws which have

been adopted by the several states. The interest arises from the question
whether the change made by a particular state is a salutary one, in view
of its inevitable result of making non-uniform a uniform act; and in the
additional question of whether it is so salutary that every other state
should follow the example and adopt the same change.
The purpose of this note is to show the result of a change adopted in
Illinois, Idaho, and Montana, of section nine, subsection three of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. The Uniform Act reads as follows:
IX. "The instrument is payable to bearer:
'(3) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existent
person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable'.'
The variation adopted by the three states consists in the following additions:
IX. "The instrument is payable to bearer:
'(3) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existent
or living person not intended to have any interest in it, and such fact
was known to the person making it so payable, or known to his employee or other agent who supplies the name of such payee'.2
It is unnecessary to dwell long on the result of the first change,
namely "or living person not intended to have any interest in it." This
seems merely to be a statement in these three acts of the general law
built up in decisions interpreting this section of the Negotiable Instruments Law. It is, simply, a codification, we might say, of the interpretative law arising from the act. Many cases have decided that where an
instrument is drawn to an actual existing person, but one who is not
intended by the person making the instrument payable to have any
interest in the instrument, the payee is fictitious in the eyes of the law,
and the instrument is a bearer instrument under the Negotiable Instruments Law.3
Under the second change, namely, "or known to his employee or
other agent who supplies the name of such payee", the law has been
more seriously affected. The typical case to which this change in the
statute applies is where a large business has an agent or officer draw its
1

2

UN-FORm NEGOTIABLE INsmUmwS LAW.
Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1937, Chap. 98, p. 2130; Rev. Codes of Mont., 1936, chap. 197,

No. 8416; Beutel's, "Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law," Sixth edition for
Idaho statute.

8 Bartlett v. First National Bank, 247 111.
490, 93 N. E. 337 (1910); Snyder
v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 AtI. 876 (1908); Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982, 23 L. R. A. 584 (1894).
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checks for it, or where it has one agent to supply the names.of payees, and
another agent or officer to execute its checks to those payees; and, one of
these agents fraudulently draws checks or supplies names of payees, later
forges the indorsement of the payee, and cashes the check for his or her
own benefit. The question arises whether the bank cashing such check
is liable for paying out on a forged instrument, or whether the company,
whose agent perpetrated the defalcation, is liable on the grounds that
the knowledge of the agent that the payee was fictitious or not intended
to have an interest in the instrument is imputed to the company, and
therefore the instrument, because of this knowledge of the company, is
a bearer instrument under section 9 (3) of the Act. This is not only the
typical case, but practically the only case in which the problem becomes acute, and, as we shall see, is the case responsible in Illinois for
the legislative change in the statute. The cases involving this problem
may be divided into three classes at common law:
I. Where the agent who perpetrates the fraud is authorized by
the company to execute instruments for the company, and thus
his knowledge of the fictitious payee or person not intended to
have an interest is imputed to the company.
II.

Where the company has been negligent, and this negligence
is considered to determine the liability of the compnay for the
acts of the agent, although the agent is not authorized to execute instruments for the company.

III. Where the agent who perpetrates the fraud is not authorized by
the company to execute instruments for the company, and thus
his knowledge of the fictitious character of the payee or person
not intended to have an interest is not imputed to the company.
I. Under the first class of cases under the formerly existing law, the
innovation in this particular section of the statute will have little effect,
since it is well settled that where an officer of a company is authorized
to execute instruments for thecompany, any such instrumefit made out
to a fictitious payee, or to a person not intended to have any interest
therein, will be held to be payable to bearer, and a bank paying out
money on such an instrument will not be liable. 4 This question is decided more on a question of agency than negotiable instruments. The
authorized officer is acting within his authority when he makes out
checks, and the company cannot deny liability when he perpetrates
fraud by use of his recognized authority.
4 Bartlett v. First Nat. Bank, 247 Il. 490, 93 N. E. 337 (1910); Phillips v.
Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556, 35 N. E. 982, 23 L. R. A. 584 (1894) ; American Hominy Co. v. Nat. Bank, 294 Ill. 223, 128 N. E. 391 (1920) ; Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 187 Ky. 44, 218 S. W. 465 (1920); Snyder v. Corn Ex-

change Nat. Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atl. 876 (1908); Norton v. City Bank and Ins.
Co., 294 Fed. 839 (1923); Litchfield Suttle Co. v. Cumberland Valley Nat. Bank,
134 Tenn. 379, 183 S. W. 1006 (1916).
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II. The second class of cases is obviously an attempt by the courts
to reach an equitable decision, by mitigating the harshness of the law
holding banks liable for paying out under forged instruments. They
introduce the question of negligence on the part of the plaintiff drawer,
whose agent fraudulently procured money from the bank knowing the
payee to be fictitious. In Fletcher American National Bank v. Crescent
Paper Company,5 it was held error for the court to charge the jury that
the drawer was not required to examine the indorsements on the checks
to ascertain if they were genuine. The law requires a depositor to exercise due care in examining his account and vouchers to know whether
or not the balance shown to his credit is correct, and he is charged with
whatever knowledge he would have acquired by making such an examination in a reasonably careful manner. In this case, by delegating the
examination to the delinquent clerk, the employer was chargeable with
knowledge of whatever information would have been disclosed to an
honest clerk by reasonably careful examination and this was a question
for the jury. The fraudulent knowledge of the clerk was not held imputed to the employer. 6 In Osborn v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 7
it was held that plaintiffs were barred by negligence, when they failed
to examine returned vouchers or to investigate the fact that the swindling clerk was living extravagantly and when they did not report to the
bank at once after the discovery of the forgeries.8 However, in United
States Cold Storage Company v. Central Manufacturing DistrictBank,9
it was held that "Negligence of the drawer of a check is immaterial,
unless it is such as directly and proximately affects the conduct of the
bank, in the performance of its duties." And in Crawford v. West Side
Bank,10 it was held that the question of negligence cannot arise unless
the depositor has, in drawing his check, left blanks unfilled, or by some
affirmative act of negligence, facilitated the commission of a fraud by
those into whose hands the check may come.
I submit that the change in the Illinois statute will do away with the
necessity of bringing up the question of negligence of the company in
cases of this type, since under the statute the knowledge of the unauthorized clerk supplying the name of a payee to the instrument will be
imputed to the company, and the company will thereupon be liable on
the instrument which will be a bearer instrument if the payee is fictitious or a person not intended by the agent to have an interest in the
instrument.
III. I have left to the last the third type of case, since in that lies
the target at which the statute was aimed, and in that is seen a com5

193 Ind. 329, 139 N. E. 664 (1923).

6

BEUTEL's, "BRANNAN's NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW," 6th ed., p. 214.

7

218 Ill.
App. 28 (1920).

8

BEUTEL'S, "BRANNAN'S

9

343 Ill.
503, 175 N. E. 825, 74 A. L. R. 811 (1931).

10

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW," 6th ed., p. 214.

100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E. 881 (1885).
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plete reversal of 'the law brought about by the statute. The results in
this type of case, before the statute, were responsible for the passage of
the statute. The rule before the change in the statute is well settled.
The case of United States Cold Storage Company v. Central Manufacturing District Bank 11 gives the common factual situation and represents the law in Illinois as well as represents the general law on the subject. I should note that I concentrate on the Illinois case, because no
cases were found on the point in the other states having the same additions in their statutes. In the Cold. Storage case, Meister, an agent of
the plaintiff had the duty of supplying data to those having authority
to draw checks, of supplying the names of payees, and the reasons for
making checks to those payees. He did not have the authority to execute the checks. He procured checks to be drawn in favor of living persons, by giving data, and showing the propriety of having the checks
issued to these p~yees. He then took the checks, indorsed the names of
the respective payees, and cashed the checks for his own benefit. It was
held that, "the intention of the employee is not imputable to the employer so as to render applicable the rule that checks drawn in favor of
actual persons without intention of delivery to such persons are payable
to bearer." And it held that "the. general rule that notice to an agent
while acting for his principal, of facts affecting the character of the
transaction, is constructive notice to the principal, is subject to an exception when the agent is engaged in committing an independent fraudulent act on his own account, and the facts to be imputed relate12to this
fraudulent act." There are several other cases to the same effect.
The effect of the change in the statute is to completely reverse this
general rule on the point, and to impose on the drawer the liability upon
an instrument where the drawer's- agent supplied the names, regardless
of the agent's authority, and to relieve the bank from an almost impossible investigation to discover whether the indorsements are forgeries.
The purpose of the act is well stated in a pamphlet issued by the American Bankers Association. The pamphlet was written by Mr. Paton,
counsel for the Association, and peculiarly enough, the intent of the legislature in passing the act, was garnered by the court by reference to
this pamphlet in the Houghton Mifflin case which I shall refer to later. 13
11 U. S. Cold Storage Co. v. Central Manufacturing Dist. Bank, 343 DI. 503,
175 N. E. 825, 74 A. L. R. 811 (1931).
12 Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac.
293; 5 A. L. R. 1193 (1919); United Motor Car Co. v. Mortgage and Sureties Co.,
13 La. App. 385, 128 So. 307 (1930); Shipman v. Bank of State, 126 N. Y. 318, 27
N. E. 371, 12 L. R. A. 791 (1891); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Nat. Chawmut Bank, 201
Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 740 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 250 (1909); St. Paul v. Merchants
Nat. Bank, 151 Minn. 485, 187 N. W. 516, 22 A. L. R. 1221 (1922); Seaboard Nat.
Bank v. Bank of America, 193 N. Y. 26, 85 N. E. 829, 22 L. R. A. 499 (1908);
Am. Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 25 S. W. (2nd) 545 (Mo.) (1930).
13 Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 293 Ill.
App. 423 (1938).
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The pamphlet is quoted: "This amendment, drafted in the office of the
general counsel and approved by the association, enlarges the definition
of bearer paper, by including instruments payable to fictitious persons,
"Where the employee or other agent has knowledge of the fiction."
Under the existing definition, a drawer of a check having no knowledge
of the fiction cannot be held responsible for the act of his agent who
supplies the name of the fictitious payee. The person mistakenly signing such check believes it is payable to a real person and expects it to
be transferred by genuine indorsement. In point of fact, transfer by
genuine indorsement is impossible and this places an unfair burden
upon the paying bank or a bona fide holder.
"The purpose of the amendment is to place the responsibility upon
the drawer of an instrument for the acts of his agent who names a fictitious payee without the drawer's knowledge. This is accomplished by
treating such instrument as bearer paper transferable by delivery."
To understand the reason behind the change it is necessary to know
the difference between "to order" and "to bearer" instruments in respect to negotiability. A "to order" instrument can only be negotiated
by an endorsement by the payee plus delivery, whereas the "to bearer"
instrument is negotiated by delivery only. If the statute, therefore,
changes an apparently "to order" instrument to a "to bearer" no endorsement is necessary and since delivery alone is sufficient to pass title
the forgery of the payee's name is immaterial.
The cogent efficacy of the addition made in the statute in 1931 was
not to be really tested until 1938 when the case of Houghton Miffin
14
Company, v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company,
was decided. Plaintiff in this case had for many years been engaged in
the business of publishing books in Chicago and in connection with its
business had carried on a checking account with defendant bank. Plaintiff's bills had been paid by checks drawn on this account, and the salesmen employed by it from time to time had been paid by checks drawn
thereon. This suit was based upon the payment by defendant bank of
twenty checks for one hundred dollars each, which plaintiff contends
were paid upon forged endorsements of the respective payees and wrongfully charged to its account. Checks were drawn and executed by three
of the plaintiff's agents, Lane, Pierce, and Allen, who were specially authorized to execute checks. All checks, however, were prepared by Elizabeth Scott, a bookkeeper employed by plaintiff, whose duty it was to
keep records of financial transactions of plaintiff at its Chicago office,
to receive bills payable and to make out checks in payment thereof and
in payment of salaries and commissions of salesmen. She was not authorized to sign checks in behalf of the plaintiff. Each check was payable to order of a particular salesman who was in the employ of the
14
Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 293 Ill.
App. 423 (1938).
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plaintiff and the checks were executed by Pierce, Allen, and Lane upon
representations made to them by Elizabeth Scott that the salesmen to
whose respective orders the checks were drawn were entitled to be paid
the sums indicated by the checks. After the execution of the checks they
were delivered back to Elizabeth Scott to be delivered in the usual
course of business by her to the respective payees named therein. She
did not do this, but on the contrary first indorsed on each of the checks
the name of the payee, then her own, then cashed the checks at defendant bank, appropriated the proceeds to her own use and has since disappeared. When the checks were drawn, no one was entitled to the
amount. Indorsement of Elizabeth Scott was without authority and has
not been approved by any of the payees. The total amount taken was
$1400. The plaintiff's suit was for recovery of the sum thus charged to
it, and the trial court being of the opinion that the bank was liable on
undisputed facts entered judgment for the plaintiff and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that the bank in this case was not
liable because of the new statute. This clearly is the direct opposite result of the Cold Storage case, and it is a question whether the change is
advisable. This is still a matter of opinion to be made on study of the
above presentation of the results to date of the statute.
I submit that the change is certainly sound under the old legal and
equitable standard that as between two innocent persons, he who puts
a third person in a position to perpetrate a fraud should be the one to
be held liable as against he who in no wise could have raised a hand, nor
had any way of knowing what the defrauder was doing.
The company could find another arrangement by which to have its
checks made out, but if it insisted on having a particular clerk make
them out, and if it relied on the clerk's designations, then certainly it
ought to be bound by the checks made out by its hireling, as against the
bank, who in no sense can control the actions of the clerk, or the process of drawing the checks of the company. Law is built and improved
by the experience of the centuries. It strives ever to attain a greater
degree of justice. In this commercial age, where division of labor is even
introduced into the field of the execution of negotiable instruments, it
should appear that this change is an advisable one to mitigate a law
that had become too harsh in its impossible demands upon the banks.
Edward Boyle.

NuIsANCE-NoIsE-AUTOMOBILES OF PATRONS

OF

A LAWFUL Busi-

NEss.-Recent decisions tend to raise the question, in light of previous
judicial utterances on the identical or akin subject matter, as to just
how far the courts will go to suppress lawful businesses alleged to be
nuisances because of the noises which surround them where they are
dependent, entirely or in part, on the so-called "automobile trade."
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In Hall v. Putney,' where the defendant was engaged in the lawful
business of vending non-intoxicating beverages, confections, and sandwiches from a root beer stand to which customers chiefly came in automobiles, it was held not a nuisance which would be enjoined at the
instance of the plaintiffs, neighboring home owners, notwithstanding
certain objectionable noises such as honking of horns, screeching of
brakes, starting of engines, and closing of automobile doors. From all
the record in the chancellor's findings it was shown that the stand was
operated five months in the year doing a transient trade from 9:00 a.m.
to 12:00 midnight, that the plaintiffs resided two hundred and fifty feet
east of defendant's property, and that the root beer stand was situated
on a 4-lane concrete highway. In reaching its conclusion, the Illinois
2
court quoted from First M. E. Church v. Cape May Grain & Coal Co. :
"While defendant is entitled to the enjoyment of its property in pursuit
of a lawful business, that business must be conducted with due regard
to the well-recognized rights of surrounding property owners . . . The
law takes care that lawful and useful business shall not be put a stop
to on account of every trifling or imaginary annoyance, such as may
offend the taste or disturb the nerves of a fastidious or overrefined
person."
Generally, noise 3 which constitutes an annoyance to a person of
ordinary sensibility to sound, so as to materially interfere with the
ordinary comfort of life and to impair the reasonable enjoyment of his
habitation to him, is a nuisance.4 And so it has been held that "if unusual and disturbing noises are made, and particularly if they are regularly and persistently made, and if they are of a character to affect the
comfort of a man's household, or the peace and health of his family,
and to destroy the comfortable enjoyment of his home, a court of equity
will stretch out its strong arm to prevent the continuance of such injurious acts." 5 And what would be a nuisance in one locality would not be
in another. 6 Noises may be a nuisance in a populous city which would
not be in the country. 7
A fair test as to whether a business lawful in itself, or a particular
use of property, constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness or unreal
2

291 Ill. App. 508, 10 N. E. (2d) 204 (1937).
73 N. J. E. 257, 67 Atl. 613 (1907).

3 In Gaunt v. Fynney, 8 L. R. Ch. Ap. 8 (1870), it was held that a nuisance
by noise is emphatically a question of degree. Snyder v. Cabell, 29 W. Va. 48, 1 S.
E. 241 (1886), held a skating rink near residences a nuisance when noise from skating materially interfered with the comfort and enjoyment of the inmates. And it
was so held in Bishop v. Banks, 33 Con. 118, 87 Am. Dec. 197 (1865), that a nui-

sance may be produced by-offensive sounds in prosecution of a lawful business (in
this instance, the bleating of calves).
4

JoYcE, LAW op NuisANcEs, § 174.

5 Appeal of Ladies' Decorative Art Club, 10 Sad. 150, 13 AtI. 537 (Pa. 1888).
6
7

JoYcE, op. cit. supra, note 4, at § 184.
McCaffrey's Appeal, 105 Pa. St. 253 (1884).
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sonableness of conducting the business complained of in a particular
locality and in the manner under the circumstances of the case, and
ordinarily, where the use made of the property or the conduct of the
business is reasonable, no actionable nuisance is created against which
relief may be had.8 The general rule is stated in Ross v. ButlerO where,
after declaring that a lawful business will not be put a stop to for some
imaginary wrong, the court goes on, "But on the other hand, it does not
allow anyone, whatever his circumstances or condition may be, to be
driven from his home, or to be compelled to live in it in positive discomfort, although caused by a lawful business carried on in its vicinity.
The maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, expresses the wellestablished doctrine of law."
A review of authorities now indicates that noises may constitute a
nuisance, that a business lawful in itself may because of peculiar circumstances become a nuisance, and now all that remains before one can
attack the cases in point is to ascertain what tests of nuisances are applicable. In Warren Co. v. Dickinson,10 it was held that the determining
factor in an alleged nuisance is not its effect upon persons who are invalids, affected with disease, bodily ills, or abnormal physical conditions,
or who are of nervous temperament, or peculiarly sensitive to annoyances or disturbances. If not to them, to whom? A survey will show
that the proper test is the one applied to the normal man-the man of
ordinary habits and ordinary sensibilities.". And the man of ordinary
sensibility appears to be as much a will of wisp as the "ordinary, reasonable, and prudent man" of tort law!
Cases square on all four corners with Hall v. Putney are not numerous, but through a development of what one has and what one can draw
by analogy from equivalent cases, itwill be seen that the logical outcome is a purely common sense decision keeping in mind the progress of
mankind in relationship to the rights of individuals.
In the principal case the plaintiffs vied for a favorable decision on
the precedent set down by Phelps v. Winch.' 2 There the court held that
8 Sussex Land Co. v. Midwest Refining Co., 294 Fed. 597 (1923); Baltimore
v. 5th Ave. Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317 (1883); Meeks v. Woods, 66 Ind. App.
594, 118 N. E. 591 (1918). In Klumpp v. Rhoads, 362 Ill.
412, 200 N. E. 153
(1936), an injunction against a gas station was refused because the facts of the
case did not meet the test of, "when a business creates conditions which clearly render the appropriate enjoyment of the surrounding property impossible." Pig'n
Whistle Sandwich Shop v. Keith, 167 Ga. 735, 146 S. E. 455 (1929). And in Warren
Co. v. Dickinson, 195 S. E. 568 (Ga. 1938), it was asserted that where noise accompanies an otherwise lawful business, the question whether such a noise is a nuisance
depends upon the nature of the locality, on the degree of the intensity of the sound,
on times and frequency, and their effect, not upon peculiar and unusual individuals, but upon the ordinary, normal, reasonable persons of the locality.
9 19 N. J. E. 294, 97 Am. Dec. 654 (1868).
10 195 S. E. 568 (Ga. 1938).
11 Bixby v. Cravens, 57 Okla. 119, 156 Pac. 1184 (1916).
12 226 Ill.
App. 339, 140 N. E.847 (1923).
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an amusement park containing a dancing pavilion, box-ball alleys, refreshment booths, and parking spaces for automobiles was a nuisance in
fact, the evidence showing that the surrounding residents were annoyed
every night by the continual noise of rolling balls, jazz music, shouts,
laughter, starting of automobiles, and the honking of horns. Again, in
Fincher v. Union 13 where plaintiff city sought to enjoin operation of a
barbecue stand, the court held that the starting of engines, honking of
horns, and the confusion of automobiles around the stand not sufficient
justification for an injunction on the theory that the automobile is an
omen of progress which should be judicially recognized. Almost the
same view is taken in Andrew v. Perry,14 where the court refused to
enjoin a hot dog stand holding that it is not every vexatious interference connected with business which will be enjoined. Therein the plaintiff had complained of noises made by autos of the patrons of the stand.
"If one chooses to be in a congested center, and thus enjoy the many
advantages of community life he must expect to experience some of the
resulting unpleasantness. Mere inconvenience resulting from exercise of
trade will not warrant a court stepping in and restraining such business
upon the ground that it constitutes a nuisance." Although a root beer
stand was enjoined in Weber v. Mann,15 the plaintiff complained of
noises from operation of automobiles and obnoxious odors emanating
from such operation. The jury found that such emanations did not constitute a nuisance, and upon enjoining the stand because of excessive
lights did not make any finding whatsoever as to noises made by operation of automobiles.
However, in two cases, Willson v. Edwards,16 and Deevers v.
Lando,17 the courts enjoined such stands where much of alleged nuisance arose out of the operation of automobiles. In the former, it was
stated that while it was a matter of universal knowledge that the propelling of an automobile to and fro created considerable noise, nevertheless noises surrounding the refreshment stand would be enjoined because
of excessive sounding of horns, starting and stopping of autos, racing of
engines, and shifting of gears, but not as to the usual and ordinary
sounds. It seems to be rather specious reasoning. In the latter, the court
enjoined the operation of a barbecue stand located in a residential section for though a business of itself lawful is conducted in a neighborhood given over wholly to residences, if it renders enjoyment of it materially uncomfortable as to the noises and offensive odors produced,
it shall be restrained as a nuisance.
Too, there can be found a special set of cases wherein gasoline stations and public and private garages have been sought to be enjoined
13

196 S. E. 1 (S. C. 1938).

14

216 N. Y. S. 537 (1926).
42 S. W. (2d) 492 (Tex. 1931).
82 Cal. App. 564, 256 Pac. 239 (1927).
220 Mo. App. 50, 285 S. W. 746 (1926).

15

16
17

NOTES
because of a combination of factors, among which is included noises
made by operation of automobiles. These cases generally have held such
operation to constitute a nuisance where operated in a residential section, but have usually held them not to be nuisances in business sections of the community. The former view is sustained in the case of
McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church 18 where operation of a gas
station opposite a church was enjoined because cars would have to drive
in and that the noises from the starting of engines, racing of motors,
shifting of gears, and other akin noises would disturb the neighborhood
and comfort of the residents. 1 9 In Lansing v. Perry20 plaintiff's prayer
for injunction because noises from an auto sales room were materially
disturbing was refused because sales room was located in a business section. 2 ' It appears, then, that the locality of the lawful business is the
most important of the determining factors.
In cases like this, one judge has said, the court is between Scylla and
Charybdis-the right of private property . . , and the rule followed in
Parker v. Colburn 22 that no man has an inherent right to maintain a
lawful business in a manner so as it shall become a nuisance. It follows
then, from a review of these cases, that courts are shifting uneasily from
one swing of the pendulum to other, not certain with themselves how to
properly ratio three determinate factors: the rights of a person to conduct a lawful business, the rights of his customer to operate motor vehicles, and the rights of neighboring residents to live in the vicinity
comfortably and with full enjoyment of their property.
Is there anything to which the courts can fasten themselves in the
solution of this problem? In Brown v. Easterday the court suggests that
the increase of traffic is but the trivial inconvenience necessarily resulting from changes and improvements growing out of advancing civilization. These inconveniences are -shared by the general public. If the
courts tend to follow this criterion, it can easily be seen that they will
be apt to lean backwards to protect proprietors of lawful businesses
18 120 Okla. 40, 248 Pac. 561 (1926).
19 In Huddleston v. Burtnett, 172 Ark. 216, 287 S. W. 1013 (1926), a garage
in a distinctive residential district was prohibited where it showed that noises from
the horns of automobiles, starting and stopping of engines, etc., created a nuisance.
This was followed in George v. Goodovich, 288 Pa. 48, 135 Atl. 719 (1927), where
a garage in a residential sector was enjoined because of the noises caused by racing engines, shifting of gears, banging of doors, etc. And in Lewis v. Berney, 230
S. W. 246 (Tex. 1921), a garage had been enjoined because of the odors and noise
of automobiles stopping there.
20 216 Mich. 23, 184 N. W. 473 (1921).
21 In Texas Co. v. Brandt, 79 Okla. 97, 191 Pac. 166 (1920), it was held that
unnecessary and unusual noises made by automobiles stopping and starting at a
filling station and odors emitted by starting and stopping of automobiles not such
a nuisance as would be enjoined. A public garage in the business section was not
held a nuisance in Phillips v. Donaldson, 269 Pa. 244, 112 Atl. 236 (1920).
22 196 Cal. 169, 236 Pac. 921 (1925).
23 110 Neb.729, 194 N.W. 798 (1923).

